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CAMARA AND SEE: ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND THE PUBLIC NEED
I. INTRODUCTION
In Camara v. Municipal Court' and its companion case See v.
Seattle,2 the Supreme Court of the United States recognizes the
individual's right of privacy from governmental intrusion as the
foundation of fourth amendment protection and brings the nature
of the relationship of the amendment's "reasonableness"3 and "war-
rant"4 clauses into clearer focus. Camara holds that a householder
has a right to refuse entry to his residence when a housing inspec-
tor seeks to make a warrantless inspection. See adds a different
wrinkle, concluding that the owner of a commercial building not
used as a private residence has a right to refuse a similar warrant-
less inspection.
The Camara Court finds that the basic purpose of the fourth
amendment is to shield the individual's right of privacy from arbi-
trary governmental intrusions. Prior to Camara the only practical
protection offered by the fourth amendment to the householder
during an inspection of his home was a bar against use of illegally
seized evidence in a criminal prosecution.5 But the exclusionary
rule operated only when there had been an unconstitutional inva-
sion of the householder's privacy and aided only those who were
subsequently charged with a crime from evidence seized in the
inspection. While this rule may have provided householders with
adequate self-protection, Camara and See hold that the individual's
right of privacy demands better insulation-that citizens have the
right to refuse entry to their homes and businesses when inspectors
lack search warrants. Camara thus overrules Frank v. Maryland6
which held that warrantless housing inspections were not "unreason-
able searches" since they did not unduly infringe upon the "self-
protection" interests of occupants.
1 Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco,
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
2 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
3 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated. ... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4 "rN]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CoxsT. amend.
IV.
5 Cf. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
6 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
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The fourth amendment of course permits reasonable searches
which invade the individual's privacy. Camara requires the inspec-
tor to procure a search warrant when the householder does not
,consent to the proposed inspection. Search warrants receive fourth
amendment approval only when issued upon probable cause, tradi-
tionally a rigid evidentiary standard.7 Camara recognizes the gen-
eral "reasonableness clause" as "the ultimate standard"s of fourth
amendment protection and constructs a reasonableness test which
involves "balancing the need to search against the invasion which
the search entails."9 Therefore, probable cause is seen as a standard
within a standard, with the suppleness of the reasonableness test
demanding corresponding flexibility in the quantum of evidence
necessary to satisfy probable cause.
From this synopsis of Camara and See, it is readily apparent
that the Court has worked substantial change with the procedural
safeguards which implement the fourth amendment. This note will
examine the Court's stated and unstated rationale, will suggest
some possible ramifications of its opinions, and will conclude with
a recommendation for legislation to implement the very general
procedural guidelines set out by the Court for "area" inspections.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE
INSPECTION OF HOMES AND BUSINESSES
A. THE FRANK VIEw: SELF-PROTECTION PERITTED WARRANTLESS
INSPECTIONS
Prior to Camara, Frank v. Maryland0 comprised the precedent
Supreme Court case law on housing inspections." In Frank a Balti-
7 Probable cause exists "[i]f the facts and circumstances before the offi-
cer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing
that the offense has been committed...." Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 161 (1925).
8 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967); accord, United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), where a search of defendant's
desk and file cabinets was conducted without a warrant as an incident
to defendant's arrest, even though there was time to obtain a search
warrant. The warrantless search was upheld as reasonable: "The
relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search war-
rant, but whether [after a lawful arrest] the search was reasonable."
Id. at 66.
9 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
t0 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
11 There have been only two other cases concerning housing inspections
litigated before the Supreme Court of the United States. In District
of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1949), following a complaint about
defendant's home, a health officer sought to inspect it without a war-
rant. The homeowner refused, claiming that such a search would
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more inspector received complaints of rats in a house located on
Aaron Frank's block. The suspected house was rundown and there
were piles of rodent feces at the rear of the dwelling. The munici-
pal health code provided for daytime inspections where there was
cause to suspect that a nuisance existed in any house. The ordi-
nance prescribed fines for refusing entry to an inspector and for
failing to correct substandard conditions following a warning by
the inspector.
Frank refused the official's request to enter. He was thereupon
arrested, convicted, and fined twenty dollars. His appeal was denied
certiorari by the Maryland Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court
of the United States, in a five-four decision, 2 upheld Frank's con-
viction and ruled that an ordinance authorizing "civil" inspection
of homes without the householder's consent and without a search
warrant violated neither due process nor the individual's rights of
"personal privacy" and "self-protection."
It has been ably argued that the fourth amendment was not
fully implemented in the actual decision-making of the Frank
Court.13 Although Justice Frankfurter, author of the majority
violate her constitutional rights. The District regulation authorized
health officers to inspect buildings "supposed or reported to be in an
unsanitary condition" and provided sanctions for anyone interfering
with such inspections. The Court, in a six-two decision, affirmed set-
ting the conviction aside, but on non-constitutional grounds.
In Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960), the Court
followed Frank v. Maryland and denied a homeowner's habeas corpus
application following his arrest for refusing to allow a housing inspec-
tion without a search warrant. The request to inspect was neither
founded upon a complaint nor as part of an area inspection, and no
other justification was ever given. The inspectors were unable to
show proper credentials the first two times they knocked on the door.
The Dayton, Ohio, ordinance required the inspectors to show cre-
dentials and permitted inspection only at reasonable hours.
Justice Brennan, in dissenting to the per curiam opinion, con-
sidered this Dayton ordinance to be broader than the one in Frank
since the Ohio ordinance did not necessitate that the inspectors have
cause for the inspection. He suggested the possibility that the requests
to inspect Price's home may have been made as a result of 'personal
or political spite" or as a "caprice." Although the dissent in this
four-four decision considered the Frank doctrine to have been broad-
ened by the Court's determination that Frank controlled this factual
situation, such an inference probably was unfounded for the Court
wrote no opinion and in no way acknowledged that it considered itself
to be dealing with a changed factual situation.
12 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
13 Justice Brennan dissenting in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S.
263, 274 (1960), challenged whether the Frank majority's stated adher-
ence to the due process principles recognized in Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 27 (1949), was really followed in its reasoning. That is, he
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opinion in Frank, implied that the power to inspect without a war-
rant under such an ordinance was a reasonable search 14 under the
fourth amendment, Frank's ratio decidendi was that civil inspec-
tions "touch at most upon the periphery of the important interests
safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against offi-
cial intrusion." 15 It is fair to infer from the Court's clouded lan-
guage that the determinative test was one of fundamental fairness,
with the interests protected by the fourth amendment composing
the major factor. Notwithstanding the Frank Court's uncertainty,
its analysis of the protections afforded by the fourth amendment in
the housing inspection context was very significant because it was
the first time the Court had spoken to the issue.
While Frank did not state that the fourth's shield against self-
incrimination of the householder from evidence obtained during
an inspection had priority over the householder's right of privacy,
the opinion did convey this implication. Justice Frankfurter gave
great weight to the fact that housing inspections were "civil" in-
spections not conducted for the purpose of seizing evidence for
criminal prosecution. The official intrusion in an inspection was
found to be but a minor infringement upon one's claim of privacy.
The Court considered the ordinance empowering warrantless in-
spections to be "hedged about with safeguards" and concluded that
questioned whether the Frank Court actually construed the fourth
amendment guarantee against official intrusion upon one's privacy to
be enforceable against the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. As Justice Brennan pointed out, Justice
Whittaker's concurring opinion in Frank "indicates some concern in
that respect." Justice Whittaker did preface his concurrence, condi-
tioning it on his understanding that the Frank majority was applying
the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. Frank v. Maryland, 359
U.S. 360, 373 (1959). See Comment, State Health Inspections and "Un-
reasonable Search": The Frank Exclusion of Civil Searches, 44 M=.
L. REv. 513, 514-19 (1960), and Note, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 265, 270-71
(1959).
14 An excellent comment on Frank v. Maryland summarized as follows:
"Thus, Frank could reasonably be regarded as support for the alter-
native propositions that: (1) the protections from unreasonable search
required by the fourth amendment are substantially 'incorporated' in
the fourteenth amendment, but are not violated by the power of search
enforced in Frank; or (2) the due process clause only requires state
officers to respect the fundamental safeguards which are essential to
the American concept of a free society, and though the precedents of
the fourth amendment may be relevant to a determination of what is
essential, the power of search enforced in Frank violates none of
those 'fundamental' safeguards." Comment, State Health Inspections
and "Unreasonable Search": The Frank Exclusion of Civil Searches,
44 MIxNN. L. REv. 513, 516-17 (1960) (footnotes omitted).
15 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959) (emphasis added).
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the attempted inspection fairly complied with the ordinance's pro-
visions, thereby satisfying the reasonable search requirement of
the fourth amendment.
While this adjudication was sufficient to decide the case, the
Court moved its inquiry to the "warrant clause" of the fourth
amendment. With much broader ramifications, the Court found
that to require a warrant procedure (using a traditional probable
cause test) as a check on the reasonableness of housing inspections
would greatly hinder the power of administrative inspection and
the enforcement of community health standards. The Frank opin-
ion then wandered to the due process arena where the Court prom-
ised support of a dynamic concept of due process, but instead
placed substantial reliance upon what it found to be long-time
public acceptance of warrantless health inspections. Since the in-
spection procedures under the ordinance were reasonable and had
general public acceptance, the Frank Court found no denial of due
process in the homeowner's conviction for refusing entry to a
housing inspector who had no warrant.
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Frank, foreshadowed what was
to come when he stated that the basic interest protected by the
fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches was man's
right to privacy in his home. In the dissent's view, this right of
personal privacy belonged fully to all men whether criminal sus-
pects or not.
The fourth amendment debate crystallized around the priority
given by Frank to the self-protection interest. There were strong
indications before Camara that the right of privacy had emerged
as the foremost fourth amendment interest.16 The Camara Court
squarely recognizes this proposition.
B. CA ARA: THE RIGHT OF PRIVAcY REQUIRES SEARCH WARRANT
PROTECTION
Subsequent to Frank and prior to Camara, the Supreme Court
clarified the relationship between the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments in Mapp v. Ohio,17 by finding that the fourth amendment,
through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, bars ille-
gally seized evidence from admission in state courts. Therefore,
16 "The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect per-
sonal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State."
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). Cf. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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the Camara Court looks at the fourth amendment from a different
and clearer perspective than did the Frank Court.
In Camara a routine annual inspection for violations of the San
Francisco Housing Code was in progress when an inspector was
informed by an apartment house manager that part of the ground
floor was being used by a tenant as a personal residence. Ground-
floor residences allegedly violated the building's occupancy permit.
The tenant, Roland Camara, refused to allow the inspector to enter
the premises without first obtaining a search warrant. During the
ensuing two weeks Camara twice more refused to allow the inspec-
tion to be made without a warrant. Criminal proceedings were
then commenced against him for violating a housing code provision
which permitted city inspectors to enter any building in the city
at a reasonable time of day.'8 Camara's action for a writ of prohibi-
tion to the criminal court was denied by a California Superior
Court. The district court of appeals affirmed and the California
Supreme Court denied Camara's petition for hearing.
The United States Supreme Court, in a six-three decision, 9
vacated the judgment and indicated that the writ of prohibition
should be issued by the California court. In an opinion written by
Justice White, Camara rules that ordinances authorizing the in-
spection of private residences without the protection of a warrant
procedure and without the consent of the occupants are unconsti-
tional.20 Fourth amendment interests are considered to be primary
in judging the constitutionality of warrantless housing inspections,
in contrast to the "peripheral" involvement suggested by Frank.
18 SAN FRANcIsco, CAL., MuNIciPAL CODE § 503.
19 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
20 It will be of interest to Nebraska readers that the Omaha, Nebraska,
"minimum dwelling standards" ordinance has guaranteed Omaha resi-
dents these safeguards since August 23, 1960. "Upon refusal by the
owner or occupant to permit inspections at reasonable times, the
Administrator, or his authorized representatives, upon due cause, may
apply to any court of competent jurisdiction for a warrant authoriz-
ing entry of the premises and inspection thereof. Refusal to honor the
warrant and permit inspection of the premises shall constitute a mis-
demeanor." OMAnA, NEB., MuNiCIPAL CODE, C. 53.08.010 (1960).
However, the Lincoln, Nebraska, Municipal Code does not give
these safeguards: 'Tor the purpose of making such inspections the
health officer, upon displaying proper identification, is hereby author-
ized to enter, examine, and survey at all reasonable times all dwellings,
dwelling units, rooming units and premises." LIwCOLN, NEB., M NiCIPAL
CODE, c. 21.08.010 (1960). The Chief of the Fire Department has the
right to enter any house or building to inspect as often as he deems
necessary. IaNCOLN, NEB., MUMcIPAL CODE C. 19.08.150 (1960). It ap-
pears safe to conclude that the Lincoln ordinances are unconstitutional
under Camara.
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Camara makes clear that the basic purpose of the fourth amend-
ment "is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials."21 However, the
Court at the same time points out that this right of privacy is not
absolute and in certain cases must make some accommodation with
the governmental interest. If a valid public interest justifies the
contemplated intrusion, the reasonableness requirement has been
satisfied. The Court is cognizant that housing inspections usually
are not significant intrusions upon the householder's privacy, but
finds that warrantless inspection procedures as approved by Frank
do not adequately safeguard this right from possible abuse.
The critical point for the householder's right of privacy is the
inspection's initial stage-the confrontation at his door. Under
Frank when the inspection ordinance gave a right of entry without
a warrant, the occupant's right of privacy was left "subject to the
discretion of the official in the field."22 The inspector's knock often
caught the householder by surprise. A flash of the inspector's cre-
dentials accompanied by an authoritative announcement that he
had the right to inspect generally left the average citizen in a
quandry as to what his rights were.
This loophole in the Frank system made the possibility of crim-
inal entry under the guise of official authority "a serious threat to
personal and family security."23 Because of this omnipresent threat
to the individual's right of privacy inherent in the warrantless
inspection, the Camara Court deems such inspections unreasonable
when administered without the guarantee of a warrant procedure.
When the householder has doubts as to whether enforcement of the
code requires inspection of his premises or questions about the
lawful limits of the inspector's power to search and actual authority
to search, he has the right to refuse entry until these questions
have been reviewed by a magistrate as witnessed by a search
warrant.
Camara goes on to find these warrantless inspections unreason-
able even assuming self-protection to be the cornerstone of the
fourth amendment. The majority opinion points out that while
inspections under the regulatory codes are not searches for "evi-
dence of criminal action," these housing codes are uniformly en-
forced by criminal sanctions. Defendant Camara's refusal to permit
21 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
22 Id. at 532.
2 Id. at 531.
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the inspection was itself a crime under the San Francisco Code.21
The Court notes that even when occupants consent to warrantless
inspections they can be subjected to criminal punishment for non-
compliance with the inspector's directions to make repairs under
virtually all city housing codes. Camara recognizes that these po-
tential criminal penalties are sufficient reason for requiring a war-
rant procedure in the housing inspection context.
In See v. Seattle25 the owner of a locked commercial warehouse
was arrested, convicted, and given a suspended fine for refusing
entry to a Seattle fire inspector during a periodic city-wide canvass.
The inspector sought access under an ordinance permitting fire
inspections of all buildings (except residential dwellings with two
or fewer units) "as often as may be necessary." 26 See's conviction
was affirmed by the Washington Supreme Court. The case was then
argued before the United States Supreme Court together with
Camara. The Court found the Camara rationale controlling in re-
versing See's conviction.
The businessman has a right of privacy too. While protection of
this right requires a suitable warrant procedure, See recognizes
that business premises may reasonably be inspected "in many more
situations than private homes. '27 The Court forthrightly states
"that administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of
commercial premises which are not open to the public may only
be compelled through prosecution or physical force within the
framework of a warrant procedure. 28
That the individual's right of privacy would be enhanced by
a warrant requirement when he does not consent to the inspection
request has been clearly shown. However, the Camara Court rec-
ognizes that the fourth amendment permits some "accommodation
24 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 507. The ordinance prescribes
sanctions not to exceed a five hundred dollar fine and/or six months
imprisonment per day of violation. The severity of the penalty did
not enter the Court's decision. The Frank and Camara Courts agree
on this point. Justice Clark, in his objection to granting probable juris-
diction in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246 (1960), saw the
only possibility of distinguishing Eaton from Frank to be the more
severe penalty imposed by the ordinance in Eaton. No such distinc-
tion was made as the Court considered Frank to be controlling and
upheld Eaton's conviction.
25 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
26 SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 87870, c. 8.01.050.
27 See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967). See Schwartz, Crucial Areas
in Administrative Law, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 425-26 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
28 See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967).
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between public need and individual rights."29 The Court presents
an excellent outline of the interests balanced in fourth amendment
decisions:
In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a
general exception to the Fourth Amendment, the question is not
whether the public interest justifies the type of search in question,
but whether the authority to search should be evidenced by a
warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden
of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental pur-
pose behind the search.3 0
In defense of implementing a warrant system, the Camara
Court indicates that all dwellings located within the boundaries
of area inspection programs will still be examined under the war-
rant machinery to be prescribed. Justice White sees no merit in
expressed fears that a warrant procedure will impede area inspec-
tion programs. The effectiveness of most inspections in no way
depends upon immediate entry at a particular time and records of
past inspection programs indicate that very few householders will
refuse inspection requests. Justice White carefully emphasizes that
this warrant system in no way prevents prompt, warrantless inspec-
tion in certain emergency situations, such as seizure of unwhole-
some food, destruction of tubercular cattle, and the enforcement of
health quarantines and compulsory smallpox vaccinations.
Justice Clark, author of the dissenting opinion, applicable to
both Camara and See, accepts the Frank reasoning as settling the
fourth amendment issue. Consequently, the dissent concerns itself
with criticizing the "newfangled" warrant system and the prostitu-
tion of the probable cause standard. Justice Clark argues that an
inspection system based on the premise that the occupant can refuse
entry to the inspector initially and require him to secure a search
warrant will encounter such a high rate of refusals that the burden
upon the magistrates in issuing the warrants will bring about a syn-
thetic warrant procedure. The results of a voluntary home inspec-
tion program in Portland, Oregon, are offered to support the dissent's
hypothesis. Portland's 1966 record showed that 2,540 refusals were
encountered out of 16,171 calls, approximately one out of every six
residences contacted. The dissent submits that inspections will be
denied by many householders who are aware that costly repairs
are needed but who hope to forestall detection of these and to
thereby minimize maintenance costs.
The dissent argues that pressures will mount upon magistrates
due to the considerable delay while inspectors secure warrants.
29 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
30 Id. at 533.
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The fear arises that some magistrates will turn the warrant process
into a "rubber stamp" proceeding, destroying the integrity of the
warrant and bringing disrepute upon the magistrate and the judi-
cial process. As an alternative, the dissent suggests that house-
holders should have the right to ask for a showing of credentials
by the inspector and to resolve their other questions by calling the
inspector's superior.
The Portland statistics are from a truly voluntary program,
where the occupant's refusal is accepted by the inspector as final-
a cancellation. Under the Camara warrant system, the occupant's
refusal will only gain him postponement of the inspection. The
inspector will return subsequently with an inspection warrant, so
the householder at most can gain a few days delay by his refusal.31
However, it is unlikely that many householders will exercise this
right whimsically because in doing so they run the practical risk
of provoking the inspector by the delay-an imprudent error since
most code offenses are matters of discretion with the inspector.
While undoubtedly the sixteen per cent refusal rate postulated by
the dissent is too high, the number of people asserting their rights
of privacy should rise, but not to the extent that inspectors will be
intolerably burdened.
It has been suggested that impatient inspectors who have been
compelled to postpone searches and obtain warrants will become
very angry by the delay and may frequently use the warrant as a
license to be inconsiderate. 32 While there is some validity to this
argument, it merely underscores the need to better educate inspec-
tors as to the importance of the individual rights advanced by the
warrant requirement. Considerate inspectors will be unmindful of
the delay since they are cognizant of the societal values the warrant
procedure represents. Under Frank the householder's only recourse
to an immediate inspection, no matter how potentially embarassing,
no matter how obnoxious the inspector, was to request a postpone-
ment from the inspector himself. While the inconsiderate inspector
is not averted by the Camara procedure, the householder can rebut
the inspector's entry should he act ill-manneredly following his
31 LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The
Camara and See Cases, 1967 SUPREME COURT REVIEW 1, 22-23 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as LaFave]; Comment, The Fourth Amendment and
Housing Inspections, 77 YALE L.J. 521, 527-29 (1968); Comment, Ad-
ministrative Inspection Procedure under the Fourth Amendment-
Administrative Probable Cause, 32 ALBANY L. REv. 155, 168 (1967).
32 Comment, Administrative Inspections and the Fourth Amendment-A
Rationale, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 288, 292 (1965).
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knock on the door or should he arrive at an incommodious moment
-at least until he returns with a warrant.33
While the conclusion that warrantless inspections without the
consent of the occupants violate the fourth amendment was suffi-
cient to rule on the merits in both Camara and See, the Court
realized that the nature of the municipal inspection programs in-
volved would not permit this determination to be the end of its
inquiry.
I. AREA INSPECTIONS
A. THE REASONABLE SEARcH: A BALANCNG OF INTERESTS
"[I]n applying any reasonableness standard, including one of
constitutional dimension, an argument that the public interest de-
mands a particular rule must receive careful consideration. '"34 Both
the majority and dissent in Camara recognize a valid governmental
interest in area inspections as a tool of municipal code enforce-
ment. In reaching an abstract determination that area inspections
policed by a warrant procedure are "reasonable searches" the Court
finds "unanimous agreement among those familiar with this field
that the only effective way to seek universal compliance with the
minimum standards required by municipal codes is through routine
periodic inspections of all structures."35 In so assuming the "need
to search" factor of the reasonableness scale, the Court prevents a
clear analysis of the practical operation of its "need to search"
versus "the invasion which the search entails" test.
However, the Court's reasoning can hypothetically be recon-
structed from the housing inspection theories advanced by com-
mentators cited by the Court.86 There is an obvious public interest
in maintaining conditions conducive to public health and safety in
all buildings and most particularly in preventing the development
of slums. City housing codes attempt to attain these goals through
enforcement of minimum standards pertaining to the operation
and maintenance of existing structures. When code violations are
discovered, the housing agency issues an order to comply which is
enforceable by sanction should the owner or landlord not provide
33 See id. at 291: "[I]n an ex parte proceeding not attended by the
individual homeowner, the existence of a spiteful motive is hardly
likely to come to the attention of the magistrate authorizing the
inspection."
34 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
85 Id. at 535.
386 See generally, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HAuv. L.
REv. 801, 801-09 (1965).
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proper repairs. Such negative policing, as noted by Frank, has been
the cities' chief weapon in the battle against urban blight for well
over a century.
Code enforcement receives assistance from federal urban re-
newal programs and neighborhood rehabilitation programs, but
these allies typically are very expensive and are best adapted to
highly deteriorated neighborhoods. Furthermore, the clearance
and rehabilitation programs "are unsuited to equally critical tasks
that require continuous citywide efforts-for example, conserving
presently adequate units or compelling structural improvements,
such as the installation of central heating. '3 7 Consequently, code
enforcement is generally considered the principal method of ensur-
ing that minimal dwelling standards are maintained.38
Before there can be compliance there must be detection. Ad-
ministrative inspections, the means of discovering code violations,
are of two types-those initiated by a citizen's complaint of a spe-
cific violation and those conducted within area inspection programs.
Although complaint-initiated inspections are a useful tool in code
enforcement, they alone cannot provide effective detection since
most violations are not reported. The untrained eye of the house-
holder will not detect faulty wiring and "low-income tenants are
often unaware of or do not avail themselves of enforcement serv-
ices. '39 Even when violations have been reported, code enforcement
has often been random since complaint-initiated inspections gen-
erally center on the alleged violations only, with landlords comply-
ing by piecemeal repair of slum buildings. The incentive for
voluntary compliance is weakened by spasmodic enforcement since
slumlords will make repairs "on their own" only when they are
reasonably certain that defects will ultimately be spotted and that
repairs will be required.
Area inspection programs, which systematically check all
dwellings in designated areas for all housing infractions, have
proved capable of effectively ferreting out code violations. Such
programs are more expensive than inspections upon complaint, but
it is argued that earlier and more extensive detection of defects
may in the long run decrease repair costs and the future need for
city clearance programs. This elementary summarization of "con-
sensus" slum prevention theory more clearly explains Camara's
finding of governmental need for area inspections.
37 Id. at 803.
38 Id. at 803; Schwartz, supra note 27, at 423; Note, 69 HARv. L. REV.
1115, 1115-18 (1956).
39 Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REv. 801, 807
(1965).
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In the "invasion which the search entails" half of the reason-
ableness balance, the Camara Court does avoid the Frank pitfall of
characterizing housing inspections as "civil" inspections. However,
the Court deftly sidesteps any meaningful discussion of the house-
holder's privacy interest and summarily concludes that these in-
spections are "a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's
privacy"40 since they are impersonal and do not seek evidence of
crime.
The final balancing factor considered by Camara in favor of
the reasonableness of area inspections is the public's long-time
acceptance of these inspections even when they have not been regu-
lated by a warrant procedure. The Camara dissent points out that
these same "persuasive factors" were relied upon by the Frank
Court when it excused the inspections from a warrant requirement.
While the Camara rationale minimizing the invasion of privacy
aspect of housing inspections does superficially appear somewhat
contradictory, the antithesis disappears when it is recalled that the
Court is now speaking of a conceptual area inspection governed by
a suitable warrant procedure.
The Camara Court's finding of reasonableness for theoretical
area housing inspections policed by a warrant procedure brought
the reasonableness and warrant clauses of the fourth amendment
into direct conflict. The Court posed the issue: "whether the bur-
den of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental
purpose behind the search."41 The Camara Court resolved this issue
by remodeling the probable cause standard for area housing in-
spections.
B. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR AN AREA INSPECTION
Probable cause for issuance of a search warrant has tradition-
ally required a showing of facts and circumstances which would
warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has
been or is being committed. 2 Most code violations are of a hidden,
indoors nature, neither discoverable by the "inexpert occupant him-
self" nor observable by an inspector outside the building. Conse-
quently, "the agency's decision to conduct an area inspection is
unavoidably based on its appraisal of conditions in the area as a
whole, not on its knowledge of conditions in each particular build-
ing., 43 This showing of course does not satisfy traditional probable
40 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
41 Id. at 533.
42 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
43 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536 (1967).
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cause. It is here the dilemma arises because Camara requires in-
spectors to procure search warrants to make area inspections when
householders have refused them entry. In establishing the warrant
requirement and in making the determination that area inspections
are reasonable, the Court obviously contemplated a warrant pro-
cedure which would continue to sanction the inspection of all
dwellings within entire neighborhoods. The probable cause stand-
ard provided the Court with a solution.
The Camara compromise is founded upon its determination that
reasonableness is the ultimate standard of the fourth amendment.
A flexible probable cause test is formulated from the mold of the
reasonableness test: "If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion
contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably re-
stricted search warrant."' ' The Court's application of the new
probable cause test to the area inspection context is vague:
'[P]robable cause' to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if rea-
sonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an
area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling.
Such standards, which will vary with the municipal program being
enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the
building (e.g., a multi-family apartment house), or the condition
of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon spe-
cific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling.45
Much earlier in its opinion, the Court states that the magistrate
will make no "reassessment of the basic agency decision to canvass
an area."46 This leaves the inference that the Court recognizes that
most magistrates lack the expertise to make the policy decisions
which underlie area inspections. It is submitted that the initial step
in probable cause determination under Camara is a court check to
ascertain that the inspection program meets constitutional and stat-
utory procedural safeguards and that it is not serving as a facade
for police harassment of a neighborhood. Once an inspection pro-
gram has been approved by a court as having "reasonable legislative
or administrative standards," the probable cause decision narrows
to a determination that the house to be inspected is located within
the perimeter of the inspection program and that the inspector
himself is properly authorized by the inspecting agency.
47
The Camara dissent wonders what proof must be shown for
probable cause for "individual inspections of specific problems" not
encompassed by an area inspection program. While the Court does
44 Id. at 539.
45 Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
46 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967).
47 See LaFave, supra note 31, at 24-25.
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not structure its probable cause test in specific terms applicable to
complaint-type inspections, it seems clear that the requisite show-
ing would be substantially less than traditional probable cause. A
written complaint should certainly be sufficient. An anonymous
phone call making a complaint would probably pose the marginal
question.
The uncertainties which surround the intricacies of the new
probable cause test create a danger that magistrates issuing war-
rants under different standards of probable cause will tend to
amalgamate these standards, creating a possible "dilution of its
force as a meaningful safeguard in criminal law administration."4 s
Skeptics of the new probable cause are provided more ammunition
by Camara and See, since the Court makes only sketchy presenta-
tions of the warrant mechanisms conceived.
C. WARRAINT PROCEDURE FOR RESmEINTIAL Am BUSnVESS AREA IN-
SPECTIONS
It is fair to infer from Camara and See that the Court intends
to establish a different warrant procedure for the inspection of
personal residences than for inspection of non-residential commer-
cial buildings. Although the actual workings of these warrant sys-
tems (including the new probable cause) will be the ultimate
determinant of whether the occupants' rights of privacy have been
truly advanced, the Court is indecisive in its guidelines for the
procedures.
Camara's first hedge is its statement that "it seems likely that
warrants should normally be sought only after entry is refused."4 9
This hesitancy seems uncalled for. If warrants can issue prior to
inspectors' calls on the basis of the lower probable cause standard
for area inspections, occupants will be placed in the same predica-
ments which occurred under the Frank system-except that Camara
will have added an impressive-looking search warrant to the legal
barrage inspectors can hurl at unsuspecting residents. Again, the
householder's right of privacy would be wholly at the discretion of
the inspector. The threat of theft under official guise would scarcely
be minimized since impersonation of an inspector would require
only the theft or forgery of a warrant. If the Court is to do more
than pay lip service to the guarantee of privacy which it seeks to
provide, the resident must at least have the right to refuse the in-
spector's entry initially and to demand that he then secure a search
warrant.
48 Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 265, 277 (1959).
49 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967).
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Despite this significant non-commitment, Camara conveys the
strong implication that a householder can refuse inspection attempts
at his whim, the first time around. Although the inspector is sure
to return with a warrant, the householder has been spared the em-
barrassment or inconvenience which might have occurred had the
initial search request been accompanied by a warrant. There is no
certainty that another embarrassing moment will not occur at the
time the inspector returns with the warrant, but the refusing house-
holder is on notice that the inspector will return sometime in the
near future. The Camara warrant procedure does not alter prevail-
ing local policy, which in most situations does not authorize forcible
entry to inspect. Therefore, illicit collaboration between police and
inspectors" should be discouraged since the knowledgeable house-
holder can refuse entry as of right until a warrant is secured and
-since forcible entries are prohibited even though an inspection
warrant has been obtained. While magistrates may not be able to
always discern such improper motives of an inspector in an ex
parte proceeding, the householder can effectively deny entry in
the face of the warrant should he suspect impropriety, since the
inspector has no power of forcible entry. However, this latter re-
fusal may bring a code conviction should he subsequently be unable
to justify his misgivings.
In See the Court asserts that "a search of private houses is pre-
sumptively unreasonable if conducted without a warrant."5' At
first glance this seems an overstatement of the Camara holding, for
Camara places great weight on its premise that most citizens will
allow inspection without warrants. Undoubtedly, the Court intends
50 A similar collaboration problem was recognized by the Court in Abel
v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960). The FBI suspected an alien of
espionage but lacked probable cause for an arrest warrant. The INS
was notified that Abel was illegally within the country. The INS
issued an arrest warrant and proceeded with the FBI to the alien's
hotel room. The FBI questioned Abel and when he refused to coop-
erate signaled the waiting INS agents to make the arrest. Incrimi-
nating evidence was discovered in the subsequent search by the FBI
and INS. In a five-four decision, the Court ruled the evidence was
-admissible as seized in a search incident to a lawful administrative
arrest. Had the Court found the INS to be serving as a tool for the
FBI the arrest would have been invalid. The crucial question on the
collaboration issue was the motive of the arresting agency, the INS:
i.e., "whether the decision to proceed administratively toward deporta-
tion was influenced by, and was carried out for, a purpose of amassing
evidence in the prosecution for crime." Id. at 230.
This "good faith" test does not solve any problems, leaving the
court with the chore of reading people's minds. Cf. Comment, The
Fourth Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE L.J. 521, 536-38
(1968).
-51 See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967).
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these consensual inspections to be considered "presumptively unrea-
sonable" only in those instances in which a householder contests an
inspector's seizure of evidence as illegal. The burden of proof then
is on the government to show the householder's bona fide consent
to the warrantless inspection. This interpretation would be in line
with the emphasis placed by the Court in Miranda v. Arizona 52 on
the heavy burden the government must carry when it relies upon
a supposed waiver of constitutional rights.
"[T]he basic component of a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment-that it not be enforced without a suitable
warrant procedure-is applicable"53 to business premises. See im-
plies that the warrant procedure applicable to business inspections
is analogous to the "rather minimal limitations" the fourth amend-
ment requires when an administrative agency subpoenaes corporate
books and records.54 An analogous warrant mechanism might call
for the administrative agency to issue its own search warrant de-
limiting the confines of the inspection before an inspection is
attempted. 55 A subpoena-type procedure might enable the business-
man to refuse entry to the inspector with an administrative war-
rant and still obtain judicial review of the agency's decision to
search without risking penalty for refusing entry. Unfortunately,
See does not amplify its plan beyond stating that the decision to
search will not be made by the officer in the field and that physical
force can be used to compel entry to portions of commercial prem-
ises not open to the public only after a warrant has been secured.
Instead, the Court chooses not to decide whether inspection war-
rants for business premises can be issued only after access is re-
fused, since "surprise may often be a crucial aspect of routine
inspections of business establishments."56 The Court finds that such
surprise warrants may be reasonable under certain circumstances
since a person's privacy interest in his business is subordinate to
his right of privacy in his home.
52 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
53 See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967).
54 LaFave, supra note 31, at 31; Comment, Administrative Inspection
Procedure under the Fourth Amendment-Administrative Probable
Cause, 32 ALBANY L. REV. 155, 168-69 (1967).
55 Federal administrative agencies which are authorized to issue sub-
poenas duces tecum include: the Federal Trade Commission, 15 U.S.C.
§ 49 (1964); the Federal Communications Commission, 47 U.S.C. §
409(e) (1964); the National Labor Relations Board, 29 U.S.C. § 161
(1964). Note that the Department of Justice can issue a civil investi-
gative demand for documentary material relevant to a civil antitrust
investigation, 15 U.S.C. § 1312 (1964).
56 See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 n.6 (1967).
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While it is unclear whether See authorizes agencies to issue
their own inspection "warrants, '57 the Court seems to indicate that
the warrant procedure must include opportunity for judicial re-
view 58 of the decision to inspect. Apparently, such review may be
had prior to the initial inspection attempt in those instances where
surprise is of the essence for an effective business inspection. The
nature of the judicial review intended by See is not ascertainable
from the Court's confusing opinion. The See Court speaks of mini-
mal limitations on investigative entry of commercial establishments,
but the procedure which the Court appears to approve could prove
very restrictive. When an administrative subpoena has been chal-
lenged and the agency seeks judicial enforcement, the subpoenaed
party can present evidence, witnesses, and oral argument. While it
is feasible that the Court might implement a brief hearing into the
procedure, it is most unlikely that the Court intends such a full-
blown adversary proceeding as exists in the subpoena situation.
D. IvPROVEmmNT OF TmH CAmARA INsPEcTioN PROCEDmURE
Ideally, the reasonableness of an area inspection program's
standards should be determined before any inspections take place.
It is most undesirable that an agency can conduct inspections under
unreasonable standards until some householder refuses entry and
the ensuing warrant proceeding declares the standards unaccept-
able-which quite likely might be after scores of inspections have
been conducted. This defect of the Camara procedure can be cor-
rected by an initial ex parte proceeding solely to determine whether
the inspection program's standards satisfy the reasonableness test.
It is conceded that an ex parte determination would not detect illegi-
timate motives which might underlie the inspection program, but
it would provide a sufficient check on the program's standards with-
out the costly delay which an adversary hearing open to all house-
holders within the area would surely cause. The proposed proce-
dure, which will be subsequently developed, does provide for adver-
sary hearings before warrants can issue to inspect the homes of
those householders who refuse entry. This latter hearing safeguard
should adequately protect against the possibility of harassment and
57 Such a proposition has been objected to by those making the tradi-
tional argument that "issuance of a warrant by the prosecuting auth-
ority is incompatible with the detached judicial oversight that is the
very heart of the warrant requirement." Comment, "The Right of the
People to be Secure: The Developing Role of the Search Warrant,"
42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1119, 1128 (1967).
58 ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894), held that a judicial proceeding
to enforce a subpoena issued by the commission satisfied the Constitu-
tion's "case or controversy" requirement.
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the initial proceeding should make certain that all inspections are
conducted under reasonable standards.
The Camara warrant system's failure to ensure that the occu-
pant's admission of inspectors without protest is not in fact a
submission to governmental authority has been said to be its "most
dubious" aspect.6 9 The possibility of such abuse cannot be slighted
since the inspector has substantial discretion in determining what
constitutes a code violation. It is probable that many householders
will sit by passively rather than run the risk of irking the inspector
by refusing entry.60 The vast majority of householders will consent
to inspections if they fall at convenient times, but Camara does
nothing to encourage such inspection policy. In fact under Camara,
an inspector who has been denied entry is under no obligation "to
indicate his intention to return with a warrant, make the time of his
return known in advance, or arrange a time convenient to the occu-
pant."61
Since code enforcement relies heavily on voluntary public com-
pliance, householders should be given advance notice of upcoming
inspections (including an explanation of their rights) and the op-
portunity to make inspection appointments. These elementary
courtesies would do much to facilitate public support for code en-
forcement. A notice-appointment requirement would not neces-
sarily burden inspection programs with additional expenses since
it would most likely reduce the nonaccess rate resulting from
householders not being home when the inspector calls. 62 Notice
59 Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE
L.J. 521, 527 (1968).
60 Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REV. 801, 811-12
(1965); LaFave, supra note 31, at 34; Note, 69 HAnv. L. REv. 1115, 1125
(1956). The proposed "Housing Code" for Lincoln, Nebraska, which
was defeated on the November 14, 1967 ballot, may have been aimed
to take advantage of the fact that many people do submit to inspection
because of the aura of governmental authority represented by the
inspector. Section 8 of the ordinance appears to provide inspectors
with a right of entry despite the clear holding of Camara handed down
five months earlier. While the city circulated literature on the code
advising citizens that entry may be refused, nowhere is this right of
refusal acknowledged in the ordinance. However, it should be noted
that the code did provide other important safeguards: (1) five days
advance notice by mail; (2) a showing of proper credentials by inspect-
ors; (3) limiting inspections to the hours of 8 A.M.-5 P.M., Monday
through Friday.
61 LaFave, supra note 31, at 35.
62 Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE
L.J. 521, 534 (1968); LaFave, supra note 31, at 35.
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could be satisfactorily given by postcards.3 The policy underlying
such advance notice correlates with Camara's recognition that sur-
prise is rarely needed6 4 in detecting housing violations since most
defects "can be hidden from the inspector only by the desired
remedial action. '65 Finally, a notice-appointment system would
substantially reduce the risk of criminal entry by unauthorized
persons posing as inspectors, since most residents will carefully
question anyone coming to inspect at other than the appointed time.
63 Dear Homeowner,
The Middletown Housing Agency will be conducting plumbing
inspections in your neighborhood next week. Your home is scheduled
for inspection on Tuesday, April 2. If you have any questions con-
cerning this inspection, please call our office, 999-9999. If April 2 is
inconvenient for you, we request that you call us and make an appoint-
ment for a different day.
We strive to conduct these inspections in a manner which does not
interfere with your home activities. Should the inspector arrive at
your home on April 2 at an inconvenient time for you, he is required
to follow your request that he return at another time and with an
inspection warrant should you so desire.
64 However, there are a few code violations, such as over-occupancy of
a dwelling, which can be hidden without being corrected. Advance
notice might very well frustrate enforcement of this standard, but it
is argued that such notice should be omitted only where the city can
show that it is essential to the public interest to abate overcrowding,
Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE
L.J. 521, 535 (1968).
Midnight welfare searches pose similar problems. A pre-Camara
case, Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of County of Alameda, 66 Cal.2d
260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967), held that a social worker
who refused to participate in early morning mass welfare raids because
he felt they were unconstitutional was not guilty of insubordination
and should be reinstated. The county had not secured legally effec-
tive consent for the searches, but even if it had, the county could not
constitutionally condition continuance of welfare payments upon the
giving of such consent. However, the court went on to state that
government can condition publicly-conferred benefits upon a waiver
of constitutional rights if it can be established: "(1) that the conditions
reasonably relate to the purposes sought by the legislation which con-
fers the benefit; (2) that the value accruing to the public from imposi-
tion of those conditions manifestly outweighs any resulting impair-
ment of constitutional rights; and (3) that there are available no
alternative means less subversive of constitutional right, narrowly
drawn so as to correlate more closely with the purposes contemplated
by conferring the benefit." Id. at 271, 425 P.2d at 230, 57 Cal. Rptr. at
630. While there is definitely a governmental interest in assuring tax-
payers that they are not being defrauded, it cannot be forgotten that
the welfare search has as its purpose the seizure of evidence of crime
and should meet similarly-strict criminal probable cause require-
ments. But cf. Note, 3 HARV. Cirv. Lm.-Civ. BIGHTS L. REv. 209, 214
(1967). See generally Schwartz, supra note 27, at 430-42.
65 Comment, Administrative Inspection and the Fourth Amendment-A
Rationale, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 288, 294 (1965).
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However, an advance notice system will not eliminate the dis-
tinct possibility that the person actually confronted by the inspector
may be unaware of his rights. Such a situation would occur when
the agency's postcard does not reach the residence or when some-
one other than the recipient of the postcard answers the inspector's
knock. The right of privacy of these uninformed householders can
be protected by requiring inspectors to explain at the door that the
agency's policy is to conduct the required inspections at a time
convenient for the householder and that the inspector is required
to follow the householder's request that the inspector return at
another time and with an inspection warrant should the house-
holder so desire.
As to those householders who did in fact receive advance notice,
this explanation would not be superfluous but should provide them
with a fuller understanding of their rights and the inspection pro-
cedure, and should thereby substantially increase the probability
that an inspector's entry without a warrant will be with the intelli-
gent consent of the householder. A Miranda-type warning has been
suggested as a method of informing the householder of his right to
refuse,68 but such a hostile-sounding warning might frighten the
individual into refusing needlessly because of undue apprehensions.
Camara permits the householder to refuse the inspector initially
without fear of sanction. But at an ex parte proceeding, inspection
warrants will issue almost automatically under the lower probable
cause standard. Therefore, for a householder to effectively chal-
lenge the reasonableness of an inspection of his home, he must
refuse the inspector when the latter returns with a warrant-at
the risk of a possible code conviction. Very few occupants will be
willing to pay this price67 so Camara's contemplated objective of
ensuring that all houses within an area are inspected will undoubt-
edly be achieved under the new system.
It has been questioned whether the public interest really
demands such "universal compliance." The Frank dissent instruc-
tively pointed out that there is a public interest in ferreting out all
crime, but this interest does not warrant the abolition of civil liber-
ties. A fortiori, the right of privacy should not be sacrificed in an
attempt to discover all housing code violations. 6 This conclusion is
66 Comment, Administrative Inspection Procedure under the Fourth
Amendment-Administrative Probable Cause, 32 ALBANY L. REV. 155,
170 (1967).
67 LaFave, supra note 31, at 27-30
68 Id. at 15: "A more fruitful line of analysis, compared to this overstated
need for 100 percent enforcement, is to consider whether the tradi-
tional probable cause test will permit an acceptable level of enforce-
ment."
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further compelled by the practicality that code enforcement is often
not vigorously pursued following discovery of violations.6 9 There-
fore, it seems clear that householders should have the opportunity to
obtain redress without being forced to defend code violation charges.
Such an opportunity should exist prior to the inspector's initial in-
spection attempt7 0 and upon the householder's refusal at the door. It
is submitted that a challenge proceeding with procedure resembling
that of a small claims court 7' would provide satisfactory safeguards
with minimal cost and delay, and perhaps could be handled by an
adjudicative ombudsman.72 These inspection warrant proceedings
would be adversary in nature, permitting the objecting occupants to
appear if they so desire. 73 Since these proceedings are designed to
69 Code enforcement tends to get watered down when it runs into build-
ings which need major rehabilitation and cannot be rehabilitated pro-
fitably and when it finds owners of rehabitable buildings who are
unable to obtain the necessary financing to make needed repairs.
When a city considers removal of undesirable buildings it must con-
sider that it will be reducing an already inadequate supply of low-cost
housing. The same result occurs when the landlord does make con-
sequential repairs as he will have to cover his expenditure by raising
the rent. Therefore, code enforcement in slum areas finds itself
balancing the landlord's ability to survive economically if he makes
repairs with the availability of other low-cost housing for his tenants
should a rent hike force them out. Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a
Tort, 65 MIcH. L. Rnv. 869 (1967); Enforcement of Municipal Housing
Codes, 78 I-ARv. L. REv. 801, 849-50 (1965).
An interesting proposal to this slum housing dilemma is that of
a civil tort action by tenants against slumlords who illegally maintain
their premises in indecent conditions, Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as
a Tort, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 869 (1967)
70 The suggested postcard advance notice, supra note 63, requests that
all questions concerning the inspection be directed to the agency.
When a protest is made, or when it is apparent to the agency that its
attempts to overcome the householder's objections have failed, the
agency would petition a magistrate for an inspection warrant. Sum-
mons would be sent to the objecting householder by mail, cf. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 27-204 (Reissue 1964). A somewhat similar prior review proce-
dure has been suggested, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Hous-
ing Inspections, 77 YALE L.J. 521, 531-33 (1968).
71 Accord, Note, 3 HARv. Civ. LiB.-Civ. RIGHTS L. REv. 209, 220-21 n.31
(1967). See generally Comment, The Establishment of Small Claims
Courts in Nebraska, 46 NEB. L. REv. 152 (1967).
72 Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE
L.J. 521, 533 (1968).
78 When an occupant refuses entry, the inspector petitions a magistrate
for an inspection warrant. Summons will be sent by mail to the
householder informing him: (1) that he may appear should he so
desire; (2) that should he not appear and should the warrant issue,
he will be given advance notice of the inspection date authorized by
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protect the householder's right of privacy, landlords should not be
permitted to use them as a dilatory tactic.7 4
These inspection warrant hearings, resulting from pre-inspec-
tion objections and refusals at the door by householders, could be
expedited and the magistrates' tasks lightened by consolidating all
protests initially into one hearing. This consolidated hearing would
take place after all the protests and refusals are received-that is,
after the agency has attempted to make inspections of all residences
encompassed by the area inspection program excluding those resi-
dences whose occupants filed initial protests. The consolidated hear-
ing would serve as the first step in the Camara probable cause deci-
sion, ascertaining whether the program satisfies reasonable legisla-
tive or administrative standards. The initial ex parte finding on this
same issue would be given no weight in this hearing and all object-
ing householders would be allowed to appear. Should the court find
the standards unreasonable, a remote possibility after the earlier
ex parte determination, the proceeding would terminate and no
warrants would issue. Following a determination approving the
program's standards," the individual protests would be broken-
down into separate hearings for the second step in the probable
cause adjudication. At the individual hearings the agency would be
required to show that the standards for conducting the inspection
program are satisfied with respect to particular dwellings-in short,
the warrant. This latter safeguard informs the householder who only
refused because the time was inconvenient that he need not appear
and it assures him that he will be given advance notice of the inspec-
tion with the warrant.
74 "Landlords suffer no invasion of protected interests when their tenants'
dwellings are inspected. Inspection of the common areas of multiple-
dwelling buildings infringes only the technical property interest con-
ferred by the landlord's legal possession of these areas. Because such
inspections threaten no invasion of landlords' personal privacy, the
Fourth Amendment does not dictate the same careful procedures re-
quired to protect the privacy of citizens in their own homes." Com-
ment, The Fourth Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE L.J.
521, 539-40 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
75 A strong argument can be made that to provide appellate review of
this decision would encumber inspection programs to the point that
the agencies would quit trying to secure warrants. Should only a
small number of appeals be made, the delay in the courts would not
do irreparable harm to area inspection programs-the public interest
does not demand that all houses be inspected, so even substantial post-
ponement of the inspection of a small number of houses would not
be unreasonable. But the probability that an appeal procedure would
be abused gravitates against its implementation. Such a denial would
not be an injustice to the citizen since he can hardly appeal the issuance
of an inspection warrant at the ex parte proceeding approved by
Camara.
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that the protestants' houses are located within the boundaries of the
program's authority. The householder could defend not only by
challenging the reasonableness of the particular inspection,'7 6 but
also by unveiling the spiteful motives of any inspectors carrying
personal or political grudges, collusion between inspectors and po-
lice, and the misuse of the inspection system as a tool of harassment.
When an inspection warrant is approved, the magistrate should
offer the householder the opportunity to make an appointment for
the inspection. When the householder does not appear at the hear-
ing, as may frequently be the case when the occupant has no objec-
tion to the inspection except that the inspector arrived at an
inopportune moment, a copy of the warrant order should be mailed
to the occupant informing him of the date of inspection. The war-
rant should be issued by the magistrate on the day of the inspection.
The Camara Court was not faced with the issue of whether
evidence seized in an inspection made with the householder's bona
fide consent or with an inspection warrant is admissible in a crim-
inal or civil proceeding unconnected with code enforcement. Al-
though ranking the right of privacy first among the objectives of
fourth amendment protection, Camara expressly acknowledges the
validity of the individual's interest in self-protection. Probable
cause for an area inspection permits a lesser evidentiary showing
than does probable cause for a criminal search. The inspection
warrant's lesser requirements are justified by the Court in part
because housing inspections are not conducted for the purpose of
discovering criminal evidence. It would seem to logically follow
that evidence seized in legal, as well as illegal, inspections should
be admissible only in code enforcement proceedings.7 7 Whether
76 It can be argued that under a truly flexible standard of probable cause
a warrant will not issue for the inspection of a relatively new house.
The probability of there being defects in a new house is quite low, for
the house undoubtedly was inspected at the time it was constructed.
However, such a rationale for inspection probable cause would present
magistrates with an impossible task of deciding when such "new"
homes become "inspectable." Inadequate standards for the exercise
of discretion are breeding grounds for abuse. A major reason that area
inspections are not considered significant intrusions upon one's privacy
is that they are impersonal-everyone in the neighborhood must sub-
mit to the same inspection. Consequently, there is no stigma from
having one's house inspected, as there may be from a criminal search
by the police. Furthermore, it has been posited that "[c]ode enforce-
ment can probably prevent deterioration most effectively by enforc-
ing higher standards of maintenance and repair in good neighborhoods
than can practically be required in slums." Enforcement of Municipal
Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REv. 801, 812 (1965).
77 Comment, Administrative Inspections and the Fourth Amendment-
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evidence admitted in a code enforcement suit, such as the neglected,
disorderly state of a residence, is admissible in a subsequent civil
suit is problematical. The issue might arise in a suit by a parent
seeking revocation of child custody from the neglectful parent,7 8 or
in a suit by the state seeking to make the child a ward of the court.
7 9
As a practical matter, courts have had and will continue to
have a difficult time determining when law enforcement officials
have received "poisoned fruit" from an inspector. 0 Since the police
can secure a search warrant on the basis of hearsay from a "reli-
able" informer,8 1 and since the warrant can be upheld without dis-
closure of the informant, 2 evidence obtained from an inspection
may find its way into the hands of the police, and even be used
by them to sustain the probable cause necessary to secure their
warrants. This occasion for possible misuse of housing inspec-
tions strengthens the argument for complementing the household-
er's right to refuse initial entry with advance notice, warnings at
the door, and the opportunity for judicial review. The probability
of anyone leaving evidence of criminal activity within the sight of
an inspector after such safeguards are effected is miniscule. In
minimizing the possibility for an illegal harvest, the proposed pro-
cedure also removes the temptation to the police for tampering
with the inspection system.
A Rationale, 65 CoLtnv. L. REV. 288, 292-94 (1965); Note, 3 HARV. Civ.
LIB.-Civ. RIGHTS L. REV. 209, 222-23 (1967); Comment, The Fourth
Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE L.J. 521, 536-38 (1968).
Contra, State v. Rees, 258 Iowa 813, 139 N.W.2d 406 (1966), where the
Iowa Supreme Court seems to hold that administrative agents who
"are in a place where they have a lawful right to be for conduct of
a civil investigation... are, by the same token in a place where they
have a lawful right to be for a search and seizure." Id. at 835, 139
N.W.2d at 419 (dissenting opinion).
78 E.g., Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966).
70 See also Katz, Foster Parents Versus Agencies: A Case Study in the
Judicial Application of "The Best Interests of the Child" Doctrine, 65
MIcH. L. REv. 145, 155-65 (1966)
80 In People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304, 200 N.E.2d 441, 251 N.Y.S.2d
452 (1964), the New York Court of Appeals overturned defendant's
conviction for violation of a city zoning ordinance prohibiting busi-
ness activity in a residential use area. The evidence which meant con-
viction was obtained by the village building inspector, who on three
occasions made entries and checks of defendant's home where the pro-
hibited business was operating. The court held unconstitutional an
ordinance authorizing official entry upon private premises for the pur-
poses of searching for evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution
without first obtaining the consent of the occupant or a warrant.
81 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
82 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
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IV. CONCLUSION
What practical protection for individual rights has Camara ad-
vanced? The right to refuse the inspector-once-if the householder
is aware of this right and if he is not intimidated from exercising
it out of awe for the official's authority. Despite the considerable
and complex re-balancing of the fourth amendment by the Court,
the householder's right of privacy in the context of a housing in-
spection has been negligibly improved-perhaps justifying the dis-
sent's charge that the new warrant procedure is but a "legalistic
facade." However, Camara can also be viewed as the beginning of
fourth amendment protection for the householder's right of privacy.
Hopefully, the re-evaluation of housing inspection procedures neces-
sitated by the opinion will provide a springboard for legislative or
administrative addition of other essential safeguards for a meaning-
ful right of privacy.8 3
Camara has added significance because of its fourth amendment
theory. There is now one less exception to the rule that searches of
private property without proper consent are "unreasonable" unless
authorized by valid search warrants. The search warrant retains
its status as the pre-eminent judicial safeguard against unreason-
able searches, but it is the "reasonableness" clause of the fourth
amendment which the Court finds to be the watchdog of the indi-
vidual's right of privacy. Because reasonableness is the ultimate
standard, probable cause for issuance of warrants must be suffi-
ciently flexible to balance the "need to search against the invasion
83 A chronological summary of the proposed inspection procedure is as
follows: (1) The agency makes its determination to conduct an area
inspection of a particular neighborhood. (2) An ex parte proceeding
is held before a magistrate to ascertain whether the inspection pro-
gram has reasonable standards. (3) If the program is approved by
the magistrate, advance notice is sent to all households by mail five
days prior to inspection. During the five-day period the householders
can ask questions, make appointments for a different inspection date,
and make protests. (4) Area inspections will then be attempted exclud-
ing those householders making initial protests. The inspectors are
required to give an explanation of the inspection and the householder's
right of refusal at the door. (5) After the area has been covered, all
protests and refusals will be considered at inspection warrant hear-
ings. The reasonableness of the legislative or administrative standards
authorizing the program will be determined at a consolidated hearing.
If the program is considered reasonable, then each protestant has an
individual hearing on whether the program's proposed inspection of
his particular home is reasonable. If probable cause is found to allow
a warrant to issue for the inspection, advance notice of the proposed
date and the opportunity to make an appointment will be given the
householder.
COMMVIENTS
which the search entails."8 4 It is the Court's recognition that prob-
able cause does not require a set quantum of evidence for the issu-
ance of search warrants which will make Camara a touchstone for
all future fourth amendment inquiry.
Russell E. Lovell II, '69
84 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
